Curacao Launches New Gaming Authority Replacing Master License System

The era of $15,000 Curacao sub-licenses with virtually no compliance requirements is ending. The new Gaming Control Board brings individual licensing, real oversight, and costs that will push many operators to either upgrade or disappear.

How the old system worked (and didn't)

Since 1996, Curacao's gaming framework relied on four master license holders: Cyberluck, Antillephone, Gaming Curacao, and E-Gaming. These entities held licenses from the government and were authorized to issue sub-licenses to operators. In practice, this meant a company could obtain a Curacao gaming license through a master licensee for as little as $15,000 to $25,000 annually, with minimal background checks and almost no ongoing compliance obligations.

The result was predictable. Hundreds of operators, estimated between 200 and 400 at peak, operated under Curacao sub-licenses. Some were legitimate businesses. Many were not. The jurisdiction became synonymous with low-quality regulation, and player protection was essentially nonexistent at the regulatory level. Disputes between players and operators went unresolved because the master licensees had neither the mandate nor the incentive to mediate.

The EU noticed. Curacao appeared repeatedly on regulatory watchlists, and several EU member states blocked Curacao-licensed operators from advertising or operating within their borders.

The new framework: AGOB takes over

The Gaming Control Board (GCB, also referred to as AGOB, the Autoriteit Hazardspelen) replaces the master license system entirely. Under the new Landsverordening op de Hazardspelen (National Ordinance on Games of Chance), every operator must obtain its own individual license directly from the GCB. Sub-licensing is abolished.

The license categories cover online casino, sports betting, poker, and lottery operations. Each category has its own application process and fee structure. Key requirements include:

• Minimum capital of ANG 500,000 (approximately $280,000) held in a Curacao-based bank account
• Full beneficial ownership disclosure with background checks on all UBOs
• Segregation of player funds from operational accounts
• AML/CFT compliance program aligned with Curacao's national framework
• Responsible gaming measures including self-exclusion tools and deposit limits
• Technical standards for RNG certification and platform security

Application fees are set at ANG 75,000 (roughly $42,000), with annual license fees of ANG 150,000 ($84,000). Add compliance infrastructure, local staffing requirements, and audit costs, and the total annual cost of a Curacao license rises from the old $15,000 to $25,000 range to $150,000 to $250,000.

The transition timeline and its casualties

Existing sub-licensees have been given a transition window to apply for individual licenses under the new regime. The GCB has indicated that operators failing to apply within the transition period will lose their authorization to operate.

This is where the real impact hits. Of the estimated 200-plus operators currently holding Curacao sub-licenses, industry observers expect fewer than half to successfully transition. The reasons are straightforward:

• Many sub-licensees chose Curacao specifically because it was cheap and undemanding. The new cost structure eliminates that advantage.
• Some operators cannot pass the enhanced due diligence checks. The old system barely looked at beneficial owners. The new system will.
• Small operators running on thin margins cannot absorb the compliance costs. A sports betting operation generating $500,000 in annual revenue cannot justify $200,000 in regulatory costs.

Operators who don't transition will need to find alternatives. Malta is more expensive and harder to enter. Gibraltar is selective. Anjouan (Comoros) has emerged as a cut-rate alternative, but its regulatory credibility is near zero. Some operators will simply shut down.

Will the new system actually work?

The framework itself is competent. It mirrors elements of Malta's MGA and the Isle of Man's GSC models, adapted for Curacao's smaller regulatory infrastructure. The question is execution.

Curacao is a small island with limited regulatory resources. The GCB is a new institution building capacity from scratch. Processing hundreds of license applications while simultaneously shutting down non-compliant operators requires staffing and expertise that takes time to develop. Malta's MGA has decades of institutional knowledge and still struggles with enforcement backlogs.

There is also the revenue question. The old master license system generated steady income for the four master licensees, which in turn paid fees to the government. The new system should generate more revenue per operator, but with fewer operators, total government revenue from gaming licensing could initially decline. Political pressure to maintain revenue might soften enforcement.

For legitimate operators willing to invest in compliance, the new Curacao license could become a credible mid-tier option, somewhere between Anjouan's near-meaningless authorization and Malta's full regulatory burden. Whether Curacao achieves that positioning depends entirely on whether the GCB enforces its own rules consistently over the next two to three years.